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The Effects of Official Action Taken
Against Problem Driversl
D. H.

SCHUSTER"

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of
official departmental action taken against the driving license of
problem drivers.
A study by Schuster ( 1969) with California problem drivers
turned up the interesting result that subsequent driving behavior
of problem drivers who were barely in trouble with the law improved if less action than normal was taken against them. Conversely, subsequent driving degradation was associated with more
severe action than normal. However, extreme problem drivers or
chronic violators who had extremely poor driving records for a
number of years showed an opposite trend. If these extreme problem drivers had had more severe action taken against their license
than normally indicated, this was associated with a more than
average subsequent improwmcnt in their driving record. If these
extreme problem drivers had less than the usual action taken, this
was associated with less than average improvement. This California
study showed that the effectiveness of punitive action against problem drivers was opposite to that intended for beginning problem
drivers, whereas for extreme problem dri,·ers, the punitive action
was positively corn·lated with improvement as intended by the
punishment.
A study by Wilkes ( 1967) showed the same trend for beginning problem drivers in Iowa as California. Iowa problem drivers
were interviewed and had action accorded to them. Subsequently
their driving improvement was better if less than the usual action
had been accorded the-m, and was worse if more than the usual
punitive action had been accorded the-m.
Unfortunately both studies were cm-relational or associative;
that is, no state-ments whatsoeve-r about cause and effect can be
made-. The question of which came first, the punitive action or
driver's subsequent driving behavior, cannot be solved this way.
Two possible interpretations exist. The driver improvement interviewer may have been sufficiently perceptive and astute to note
which drivers were going to improve and thus not have given them
harsh punitive action. Or the interviewer may have perceived that
the driver was not going to improve and thus have given more
1 This was a cooperative study done in conjunction with the Iowa Department of Public Safety; in particular, Sgt A. Chyrstal did the driver
interviewing. A note of thanks goes to R. Mendel for his help in collecing
follow-up data.
2 Iowa State Uni,·ersity.
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severe action than usual. Thus one interpretation is that the driver
improvement interviewer simply perceived the problem driver as
he really was and dealt him treatment with a certain amount of
validity. The second explanation is that the punitive action taken
at the time of the interview actually caused the subsequent driver
behavior but in an adverse direction. That is, if the problem driver
were accorded more severe action than usual, he may have told
himself, "The department thinks I'm a problem driver; therefore
I am," and he subsequently drove accordingly. If the department
gave him less severe action than usual he may have told himself,
"The department thinks I'm a good driver and therefore I am,"
and again he drove accordingly.
Action taken officially against a driver's license needs discussion here as an ordinal variable. The lowest level is that where
the Department of Public Safety takes no official action. This is
by far and away the action accorded the bulk of drivers in the
state. When a driver has two moving violations for some negligent
driving behavior on his part, the department sends him a warning
letter as the first official action. In particular warning letters arc
sent out when thP drivt>r has accumulated two moving violations
within one year; depending upon the seriousness the department
may place the driver on probation as the next lt>vel of action. The
driver's performance is monitored and further increase in his moving violations or accidents makes him liable for more severe action.
\\Then a driver has three or more moving violations and/or accidents in one year, he is liable for more severe action. This more
severe official action usually takes the fonn of 30 days suspension
of his driver's license. The driver during these 30 days is not supposed to drive, although a few drivers do so. It should be noted
that certain serious violations nonnally require suspension of
license. For instance, a single drunk driving offense for the first
time results in 60 days revocation of license. Nonnally however.
more severe action against a driver's license simply becomes more
days of suspension of driver's license such as 60, 90, 120, 180 and
suspension for one year which is tantamount to revocation. Revocation of a driver's license typically occurs for such things as continued poor driving, such as drunk driving or leaving tht> scent> of
accidents in which the driver had been involved.
METHOD

The research method used was a one-wav analysis of variance
design wherein the action taken against a driver at the encl of an
improvement interview was manipulated. At the end of a onehour improvement interview for a problem driver, the highway
patrolman examiner made up his mind as to what action he would
normally take with this particular problem driwr. Then the inter-
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viewer randomly manipulated the action as follows: 1-one step
less than normal, 2-normal, or 3-one step more than the normal
action already decided upon. To achieve the random selection, the
interviewer picked one of three numbered pencils at random from
his top desk drawer. The interviewer reached in the desk drawer
blindly and selected one of the numbered pencils. If he picked the
#3 pencil, the driver got one step more severe action than that
already decided upon, if he got the #2 pencil, he got the action
already decided upon (normal), if he got the # 1 pencil, the
driver got one step less severe action than that already decided
upon.
Drivers thus were assigned randomly to one of three treatment
groups depending upon whether they had one step more severe
than normal action, normal action, or one step less severe action
than normal for their particular case. It was to be expected accordingly that the drivers should be comparable on other characteristics
such as previous violations in the preceeding three years, previous
accidents, prior action taken against their driver's license, age, sex
ratio, and racial composition of the groups. It was also expected
that there would be some minor variation in these prior characteristics due to random fluctuations in the assignment of drivers to one
of the three groups. In particular there was some concern about
assigning drivers to the more severe treatment group, particularly
where this resulted in going from probation to suspension of license
for a period of 30 days. Originally there were 125 drivers in the
less-than-normal action group, 114 in the normal action group, and
98 in the more-than-normal action group.
Compensating for these minor variations in matching characteristics was done in two ways. First, cases were deleted appropriately from the normal and less than normal action groups such
that the characteristics under concern were matched to those of
the third group, more than normal action. After adjustment for
these minor sampling biases, the three groups were comparable in
previous driving record, age, sex ratio, and racial composition.
These matching characteristics are shown in Table 1. None of the
characteristics approached significance among the three groups at
the 5% level.
Table 1 also shows data on the 55 people excluded from the
study because they objected to and appealed the decision of the
interviewer or they brought a lawyer along with them. Either of
these two reasons was felt to constitube a justifiable basis for excluding the driver from this study. The extent of this bias was investigated by including the characteristics of these 55 people excluded from this also in Table 1.
The second method of compensating for variations in matching
characteristics of the groups at the time of the interview was
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Matching characteristics of the manipulated action groups after
adjustment ( n = 98 per group).
Manipulated Action

Excluded
(n=55)
31.53
Age in years
4.53
Previous violations
0.82
Previous accidents
1.80
Previous action'
Interview action

Averages of

Less

Normal

More

25.68
3.95
0.86
1.73
1.67

26.82
4.24
0.85
1.68
2.67

24.20
4.46
0.98
1.97
3.29

3%
4%

2%
12%

2 '/o
7%

Probability
NS
.10
NS
NS
.001

Percentages of
N on-caucasians
Female sex

5'/o
15'/o

NS

.10

NS=Not Significant at the 10% level for the three manipulated groups.
l=Action code: 0-None, 1- -warning letter (or short restriction), 2Probation, 3-Suspended, 5-30 days, 4- Suspended 45-180 days, 5-Suspended over 180 days or license revoked.

statistical in nature; an analysis of covariance was used which controlled for differences among groups on age and previous driving
record.
Both methods of compensation were used; the results simply
are different, but complementary, ways of looking at the same data.
RESULTS

Two types of analyses were made on the data. Analyses of
covariance and simple analyses of variance on the matched groups
were made on the 12 month follow-up data.
The analyses of covariance used the four co-variables of age,
previous violations, previous accidents, and previous action taken
by the department in the three years just prior to the interview.
The follow-up data in the 12 months following the interview for
the matched groups are shown in Table 2. The five criteria or
dependent \-ariahles were violations, accidents, responsible accident
count, accident severity count and follow-up action taken by the
department in the 12 months after the date of the interview. Data
for these criteria were obtained from the state driver records in
Des Moines and from filed reports of investigated accidents. None
of these criteria was significantly different at the 5jlo level among
the three groups. However, the F -ratios for moving violations and
departmental action approached significance. It is seen that the
group accorded more action at the interview had more follow-up
moving violations and more subsequent departmental action than
the other groups. The implication of this trend is that the more
severe interview action "caused" more moving violations later on
and also required more follow-up action on the part of the department.
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Follow-up driving data one year later by manipulated action
groups after matching ( n = 98 per group).
Manipulated Action

Follow-up
Characteristic

Less
Moving violations
0.74
Driving accidents
0.19
Responsible accident
counts'
0.39
Accident severity
counts'
0.36
Subsequent action
1.11

Normal

More

F

Probability'

0.66
0.26

1.00
0.21

1.91
0.39

.10
NS

0.57

0.51

0.60

NS

0.42
0.97

0.39
1.45

0.10
1.57

NS
NS

-

NS= Not Significant at the 10% level.
1: Probability of F-ratio for simple analysis of variance on matched
groups.
2: Responsible accident count coding was, 0-No accident involvement,
1-Not responsible for an accident involvement, 2-Partially responsible, and 3-Responsible for an accident.
3: Accident severity count coding was, 0-No accident involvement or
less than $100 damage, 1-$100 to $299 damage, 2- $300 to $999
damage or injury, 3---$1000 damage and over or injury.

The punitive action given to a problem driver at an interview
was intended to make the driver improve his driving behavior.
None of the criteria supports this contention. If anything, the
insignificant trends discussed above support just the opposite.
The twelve month later follow-up driving record of the three
manipulated action groups was analyzed also with an analysis of
covariance. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 3.
This shows the average on each of the five criteria for the three
manipulated action groups before matching on age and prior driving record. In the analysis of covariance the control variables were
age and previous driving record of moving violations, accidents,
and action taken by the department. Table 3 shows that none of
the differences was significant at the five percent level for any of
the five criteria between the groups. Thus, the manipulated action
was ineffective in producing improvement either as desired by the
departmental action or in line with the hypothesis of this study.
There was a slight trend in line with the latter for moving violations. Certainly the results do not support the supposed effect of
punitive action where the drivers should have had fewer violations
for their more-than-normal action.
Correlational analyses within each goup were also done to see
if action at the time of the interview was correlated with subsequent
driving record. The data in Table 4 show, in the Normal and
More-than-Normal action groups, that interview action was positively correlated with subsequent moving violations and depatmental action. There were similar trends, but insignificant, in the Less-

Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1970

5

Proceedings of the Iowa Academy of Science, Vol. 77 [1970], No. 1, Art. 45
[Vol. 77

IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE

320
Table 3.

Follow-up data 12 months after the interview by manipulation
group.
Manipulation Action

Follow-up
Characteristic
Moving violations
Driving accidents
Responsible accident
counts
Accident severity
counts
Subsequent action

More
1.00
0.21

F'

p

0.69
0.18

Normal
0.63
0.23

0.27
0.15

NS'
NS

0.40

0.52

0.51

0.14

NS

0.31
1.02

0.39
0.94

0.39
1.45

0.04
0.28

NS
NS

Less

---- -- - · · - · - -

1:
2:

F-ratio in analysis of covariance with co-variables of age, previous
violations, previous accidents and previous action.
Not Significant at the 5% level.

Table 4.

Correlation coefficients between amount of interview action and
subsequent driving record by manipulated action group.
Manipulation Group'
Less

Follow-up Characteristic
Moving violations
Driving accidents
Accident responsibility count
Accident severity count
Subsequent action
1:

*

.17
.00
.04
-.01
.08

Normal
.21 *
.23*
.20*
.17
.24*

More
.22*
-.04
-~.03

..

-.04
. 28**

Number of cases per group were, Less: 125, Normal: 114 and More. 98.
Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1 % level.

than-Normal action group. These findings also repeat those of the
previous studies, Wilkes ( 1967) and Schuster ( 1969).
CONCLUSIONS

Reconciling the analyses of variance results with the correlational results is something of a problem. The first type of analysis
lead to the conclusion that manipulating punitive action at the
time of interviewing a problem driver had no effect in a causal
sense upon his later driving behavior. The second type of analysis
indicated that, within each group of drivers with manipulated action, there yet existed the previously reported positive correlation
between interview action and subsequent driving record of moving
violation and departmental action afterward. Since the hypothesis
of a causal relationship between interview action and subsequent
driving has been rejected, perhaus the alternative hypothesis advanced should be scrutinized. This hypothesis was that the interviewing patrolmen were astute judges of drivers and meted out
appropriate action at the end of the interview. The correlational
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data in Table 4 suppot this hypothesis but cannot prove it since
such data can only show association and not causation. And of
course, yet a third phyothesis, so far unknown, could account for
these results. The answer lies in more research.
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